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Forecasting systemic impact in financial networks ∗
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Abstract
We propose a methodology for forecasting the systemic impact of financial institu-
tions in interconnected systems. Utilizing a five-year sample including the 2008/9
financial crisis, we demonstrate how the approach can be used for timely systemic
risk monitoring of large European banks and insurance companies. We predict firms’
systemic relevance as the marginal impact of individual downside risks on systemic
distress. The so-called systemic risk betas account for a company’s position within
the network of financial interdependencies in addition to its balance sheet charac-
teristics and its exposure towards general market conditions. Relying only on pub-
licly available daily market data, we determine time-varying systemic risk networks,
and forecast systemic relevance on a quarterly basis. Our empirical findings reveal
time-varying risk channels and firms’ specific roles as risk transmitters and/or risk
recipients.
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1. Introduction
The breakdown risk for the financial system induced by the distress of an individual firm
has long been neglected in financial regulation. Up to the financial crisis 2007-2009, this
systemic risk has been exclusively attributed to the idiosyncratic risk of an institution, ab-
stracting from the strong network cross-dependencies in the financial sector causing po-
tential risk spillover effects. In an extensive study for the U.S. financial system, however,
Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) (HSS) show that it is mainly the interconnect-
edness within the financial sector that determines the systemic relevance of a particular
firm. To quantify the systemic impact of an individual company, they propose the so-
called realized systemic risk beta, the total effect of a company’s time-varying Value at
Risk (VaR) on the VaR of the entire system. Firms’ tail risk is determined from company-
specific relevant factors among other companies’ tail risks, individual balance sheet char-
acteristics, and financial indicators, where components are selected as being “relevant” via
a data-driven statistical regularization technique. The resulting individual-specific mod-
els give rise to a financial risk network, capturing exposures of financial firms towards the
distress of others. These network risk spill-over channels contain important information
for supervision authorities as sources for systemic risk. Their data-driven determination
of firms’ systemic relevance from publicly available data distinguishes HSS from the
number of other recently proposed methods for refined measurement and prediction of
systemic risk, see, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), White, Kim, and Manganelli
(2010), Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009), Brownlees and Engle (2011), Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, and Richardson (2010), Giesecke and Kim (2011), Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and
Pelizzon (2012), Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2011), Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger
(2012), or Schwaab, Koopman, and Lucas (2011) among many others.
Effective regulation requires models which can be used for forecasting and which are
reliable even if estimation periods are short. The original HSS framework, however, is
not tailored to short-term forecasting of systemic risk and must be adapted for prediction
purposes. Firstly, the HSS-systemic risk network is static, i.e., it is estimated once us-
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ing the entire dataset and then forms the basis for estimation of respective time-varying
realized betas. However, empirical evidence suggests that network links might change
over time, especially in crisis periods. Secondly, in order to exploit additional variation,
quarterly balance sheet characteristics are interpolated by cubic splines over the analyzed
time period. Therefore, out-of-sample forecasting is not possible. Thirdly, the penalty
parameter required for the model selection step is chosen such that a backtest criterion
is optimized. VaR backtests, however, generally rely on counting and analyzing VaR ex-
ceedances, which is reasonable when the time series is long. Though for short estimation
periods, these tests should be replaced by more adequate quantile versions of F-tests.
In this paper, we extend the HSS framework to allow for flexible systemic risk fore-
casting. The estimation period is shortened using rolling windows of only one year of
data. This excludes influence of back-dated events on current forecasts while still per-
taining sufficient prediction accuracy. The models are re-estimated each quarter, resulting
in time-varying systemic risk networks. Instead of interpolating, information on firm-
specific balance sheets is only updated when it is published at the end of each quarter.
The model selection penalty is chosen such that the in-sample fit in the respective annual
observation window is optimal. This is examined via an F-test for quantile regression.
The empirical analysis investigates systemic risk in Europe. The data set covers stock
prices and balance sheets of major European banks and insurance companies as well as
financial indicators, including country-specific variables, during the period around the
2008/9 financial crisis. We illustrate that our approach could serve as a monitoring tool
for regulators as it captures and effectively predicts systemic relevance over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the forecasting
methodology and gives an algorithm for model selection and estimation of firm-specific
VaRs. Furthermore, the estimation method for realized systemic risk betas is given. Sec-
tion 3 describes the dataset, before discussing estimation results and their implications in
detail in Section 3.2. Section 4 concludes.
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2. Forecasting Methodology
We extend the framework of Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) (HSS) and the
HSS measure for systemic relevance in the presence of network effects, the realized sys-
temic risk beta. Whereas HSS focus on a single static network as a basis for estimating
systemic impact of financial institutions, we progress by determining time-varying net-
works in a forecasting setting. These allow capturing changing risk spillover channels
within the system, which are tailored to short-term forecasts from the model.
2.1. Time-Varying Networks
In a densely interconnected financial system, the tail risk of an institution i at a time
point t is determined not only by its own balance sheet characteristics Zit−1 and general
market conditions Mt−1 but also by indications for distress in closely related banks in
the system. For each bank in the system, we count a corresponding return observation as
marking a distress event whenever this return is below the empirical 10% quantile. In such
cases, these extreme returns might induce cross-effects on the riskiness of other banks in
the system. We record these as so-called loss exceedances, i.e., the values of returns in
case of an exceedance of the 10% quantile and zeros otherwise. Accordingly, the set of
potential risk drivers R for a bank i therefore comprises network impacts N−it from any
other bank in the system, where each component of N−it consists of loss exceedances for
any bank but firm i in the system.
We measure tail risk by the conditional Value at Risk, V aRi, for firm i and by V aRs
for the system, respectively. Using a post-LASSO technique as in HSS, the large set of
potential risk drivers Rt = (Zit−1,Mt−1, N
−i
t ) for institution i can be reduced to a group
of “relevant” risk drivers R(i)t . Selected tail-risk cross-effects from other banks in the
system constitute network links from these banks to institution i. Repeating the analysis
for all banks i in the system, relevant risk channels can be depicted and summarized in
a respective network graph. The recent financial crisis, however, has shown that such
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network interconnections may change over time as the relevance of certain institutions
for the risk of others might vary substantially. Thus adequate short-run predictions of
systemic importance should mainly be based on current dependency structures. We ad-
dress this issue by a time-dependent selection of relevant risk drivers R(i,t)t according to
the algorithm described below. Driven by the quarterly publication frequency of compa-
nies’ balance sheet information we re-evaluate the relevance of all potential risk drivers
for each institution in the system at the beginning of each quarter based on data from the
respective previous year and incorporate the latest balance sheet news. We therefore ob-
tain quarterly time-varying tail risk networks which reflect the most current information
of risk channels within the financial system. They are tailored for short-term quarterly
predictions of the systemic riskiness of firms in the system.
With the relevant risk drivers R(i,t) for firm i and time t in a specific quarter, individual









where coefficients ξ̂ are obtained in the post-LASSO step from quantile regression of X i
on (1, R(i,t)) as part of the procedure described below.
Algorithm for selecting relevant risk drivers and determining their effects in firms’
tail risk
We adapt the data-driven procedure of HSS to account for time-variation in tail risk net-
works and marginal systemic risk contributions. The automatic selection procedure is
based on a sequential F-test in contrast to the backtest criterion in HSS. Determination
of relevant risk drivers R(i,t0) at the beginning of a quarter t0 uses information of obser-
vations within the previous year. Hence it is based on approximately τ = 250 obser-
vations Rt0−τ , . . . , Rt0 , where each Rt consists of centered observations of the potential
regressors and has K dimensions. We fix a ν-equidistant grid ∆c = {c1 > . . . > cl =
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c1− ν(l− 1) > cL = 0} for values of a constant c, where c1 is chosen such that the corre-
sponding penalty parameter is sufficiently large for selecting not more than one regressor
into the model. For our purposes, we set c1 = 30 and ν = 1.
Step 1: For each c ∈ ∆c, determine the penalty parameter λit0(c) from the data in the
following two sub-steps as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011):
Step a) Take τ +1 iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of Rt0−τ , . . . , Rt0 denoted as
U0, . . . , Uτ . Conditional on observations of R, calculate











Step b) Repeat step a) B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λit0
conditional on R through Λit01, . . . ,Λ
i
t0B
. For a confidence level α = 0.1 in
the selection, set








































2 and loss function ρq(u) = u(q − I(u < 0)),
where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and zero otherwise.
Step 3: Drop all components in R with absolute marginal effects |ξ̃it0(c)| below a thresh-
old τ = 0.0001 keeping only the Kit0(c) remaining relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c)
for c ∈ {c1, c2}. As c1 > c2, the sets of selected relevant regressors are nested
R(i,t0)(c1) ⊆ R(i,t0)(c2) = {R(i,t0)(c1), R(i,t0)(c2\c1)}. If R(i,t0)(c2\c1) is the empty
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set, restart Step 2 with λi(c2) and λi(c3) from Step 1. Otherwise re-estimate (2)
without penalty term for the larger model c2 only with the respective selected rel-
evant uncentered regressors R(i,t0)(c2) and an intercept. This regression yields the
post-LASSO estimates ξ̂it0q (c2). Apply an F-test for joint significance of regressors
R(i,t0)(c2\c1) at 5% level. If they are significant, restart Step 2 with λi(c2) and λi(c3)
from Step 1b. Continue until additional regressors R(i,t0)(cl+1\cl) from penalty cl
to cl+1 are no longer found to be significant. Then the final model is obtained from
cl yielding the set of relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c2) with corresponding post-LASSO
estimates ξ̂it0q (cl) for the coefficients.
2.2. Forecasting Systemic Impact
In an interconnected financial system, we measure the systemic impact of a specific bank
i as the total realized effect of its riskiness on distress of the entire financial system given
network and market externalities. This can be empirically determined via
V aRst = α









comprises tail risks of all other banks in the system selected as relevant
risk drivers for bank i in the corresponding network topology. The marginal effect βs|i,t of
the risk of company i might vary linearly over time in selected firm-specific balance sheet
characteristics Zi∗t−1. Coefficients in (3) can be obtained via standard quantile regression
analogously to (2) without penalty term. Corresponding to the one-year estimation win-
dow for the time-varying network, we also determine parameters in (3) at the beginning
of each quarter, based on observations dating back no longer than one year. The systemic
relevance of a company can then be predicted from the beginning of a quarter t0 to the
next quarter t0 + τ̃ as realized beta
β̃
s|i













for any time point t0 ≤ t ≤ t+ τ̃ .
3. Data and Results
3.1. Data
Our sample of financial firms comprises 20 European banks and insurance companies. A
list can be found in Table 1. The dataset covers Europe-based banks deemed as systemi-
cally relevant by Financial Stability Board (2011), for which complete data sets over the
considered period are available.1 It includes the ten largest European banks by assets in
2010. Furthermore, six insurance companies are selected, all belonging (by assets) to the
top 10 insurers in the world in 2010. The regressors explaining the individual Value at
Risk (V aRi) are selected among other companies’ loss exceedances, individual balance
sheet ratios, and several financial indicators, including country-specific variables.
From quarterly balance sheets obtained from Datastream/Worldscope, three key ratios
are calculated: Leverage, correponding to total assets divided by total equity; maturity
mismatch, the quotient of short-term debt and total debt; and size, defined as the loga-
rithm of total assets. Furthermore, we include quarterly stock price volatility in the set
of possible regressors, which is estimated over the time span between quarterly reports.
Instead of interpolating the data to daily values, we keep them constant until new infor-
mation is published.2
1Banco Espirito Santo is the only bank which is not listed by the Financial Stability Board. We include
it because otherwise, financial firms from Southern Europe would be underrepresented.
2For simplicity, we assume that quarterly balance sheets become public information on fixed dates:
March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31.
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The set of financial indicator variables contains the return on EuroStoxx 600, rela-
tive changes of the volatility index VStoxx, and returns on three major bond indices
for Europe: IBOXX Sovereign, containing government bonds, iBOXX Subsovereigns,
consisting of bonds issued by government owned banks, supranationals and other sub-
sovereigns, and iBOXX Corporates. Furthermore, we include changes in three months
Euribor, the interbank lending interest rate, and a liquidity spread between three months
Eurepo, the average repo rate reflecting the cost of repurchase agreements, and the three
month Bubill (German government bond rate) as proxy for the risk free rate. To capture
aggregate credit quality in Europe, we also add the change in the one year and five year
default probability indices from Fitch as well as the change in the five year continued
series of the credit default swap index iTraxx Europe. Another two relevant economic
indicators are the gold price and relative changes of the MSCI Europe Real Estate Price
Index.
As proxies for the market’s expectations on economic growth and to capture country-
specific effects on individual VaRs, we include several ten year government bond yields
(Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, United States, and Greece) as well as yield spreads
(ten years minus three months yields) of German and U.S. government bonds. Finally,
accounting for the global interconnectedness of financial markets, we include returns on
financial sector indices, FTSE Financials Japan, Asia, and US.
When estimating systemic risk betas in the second stage, a subset of the above macro
financial indicators is required as control variables. Here, we take the changes in the
EuroStoxx 600 index, VStoxx, Euribor, iTraXX, the three FTSE Financial indices, the
real estate index, and the spread between Eurepo and the Bubill rate.
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3.2. Results
Time-varying tail risk networks
Having identified the tail risk drivers for each firm allows us constructing a tail risk net-
work. Following HSS, we take all firms as nodes in a network and identify a network link
from firm i to firm j whenever the loss exceedance of i is selected as a tail risk driver
for j. Figures 1 to 3 show the resulting systemic risk networks for the 20 financial in-
stitutions computed based on one-year rolling windows from 2006 to 2010. In order to
illustrate cross-country and inter-country risk channels, we order the institutions in the
graph according to their (main) home countries.
We identify several risk connections which are quite stable over time and seem to be
fundamental risk channels of the European financial network during the period under con-
sideration. An interesting tail risk connection is the link between Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) and Barclays. RBS was strongly affected by the break-down of the U.S. housing
and credit markets and realized substantial write-downs in April 2008. In the beginning of
2009, RBS faced a record loss and was bailed out by the UK government which increased
its stake in the company to 70 percent. Conversely, Barclays was relatively well funded
until beginning of 2008 and even explored options to take over the defaulting U.S. invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers. A further bolstering of Barclays’ balance sheet was due to
the raise of new capital by investors in fall 2008. Consequently, Barclays was less exposed
to credit crunches and did not participate in government’s insurance schemes for toxic as-
sets. The network analysis, however, reveals that both banks have been deeply connected.
Being bi-directional before the crisis, the links became particularly pronounced and rather
one-directional during the financial crisis. In particular, RBS received substantial tail risk
from Barclays further increasing RBS’s potential losses and making both companies sys-
temically risky. Interestingly, the strong risk connection between Barclays and RBS van-
ishes in the aftermath of the financial crisis which might be a result of RBS’s bailout and
ongoing re-structuring in both banks. Persistent risk connections are also identified be-
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tween Deutsche Bank and various big insurance companies, particularly Allianz as well
as between Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. The latter faced significant distress due
to investments in toxic assets originating from the U.S. housing market, and was the first
commercial lender in Germany accepting capital injections from the government. In the
beginning of 2009, Commerzbank was partly nationalised with the government taking a
25% stake. Our analysis reflects that the distress of Commerzbank also spilled over to
Deutsche Bank and thus in turn to big insurances such as Allianz and Münchener Rück.
Hence, governmental support of Commerzbank was an important step to reduce its sys-
temic risk contribution. This is empirically confirmed by our analysis as we observe a
declining tail risk connectedness of Commerzbank after the bailout.
Furthermore, the networks reveal persistent connections between UBS and Credit Su-
isse, UBS and Crédit Agricole, Agricole and Société Générale as well as Credit Suisse
and Agricole. The strong interconnections between these Swiss and French banks are
likely to be driven by exposure to the same toxic assets and resulting liquidity shortages
stemming from the U.S. market making these banks facing common funding problems.
This happened during 2008/09, where all of these banks also received substantial tail risk
spillovers from others. For instance, our analysis reveals that Credit Suisse was subject
to tail risk inflow from Barclays and BNP Paribas which - according to the identified net-
work connections - spilled over to the ’risk neighbors’ of Credit Suisse. All of these banks
received bailout packages from the Swiss and French government, respectively. As a pos-
sible consequence of these bailouts and a relaxation of the bank’s funding situation in the
aftermath, Credit Suisse’s sensitivity to tail risk inflow from Barclays and BNP Paribas
actually declined in 2009. Likewise, also the Spanish bank Santander and the Portugese
bank Banco Espirito Santo seem to be deeply interconnected. As discussed below, San-
tander serves as an originator and transmitter of systemic risk to various other companies.
These dependencies become particularly visible and pronounced during and after the fi-
nancial crisis and might have contributed to the instability and distress of the Spanish
banking system in 2012. Hence, though all these institutions operate on a global level,
we still observe a substantial extent of persistent country-specific risk channels. These ef-
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fects reflect a strong interconnectedness and consequently inherent instability of national
banking systems. These within-country dependencies are complemented by cross-country
linkages and industry-specific channels. Examples for the latter are tail risk connections
prevailing within the insurance sector including Allianz, AXA, Aviva, Münchener Rück
and Aegon. Their interconnectedness even increased during the financial crisis causing a
substantial threat for the system in case of the default of one of these companies.
Our approach, however, also captures interesting time variations in tail risk channels.
In particular, in 2008/09, we observe high fluctuations of network connections. Several
risk channels identified in this period seem to be rather caused by crisis-specific turbu-
lences and consequently vanished in the aftermath. Examples are connections from San-
tander to HSBC, BNP Paribas, Allianz and AXA. These links make Santander systemi-
cally quite risky as the bank obviously produced and transmitted tail risk to various major
players in the system. These findings are confirmed by the estimated systemic risk betas
shown below. A further example is a strong connection between ING and Aviva which
built up and increased through the crisis and vanished thereafter. The Dutch bank ING
realized significant losses, had to cut jobs in 2009 and received capital injections from
the Dutch government. Hence, our analysis shows that substantial tail risk from ING was
spreading out to Aviva and in turn to other insurances.
Analyzing the pure number of outgoing tail risk connections (illustrated by the size
of nodes in the network graphs), we identify Barclays, Santander, AXA, BNP Paribas,
ING, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole as deeply connected companies. Actually,
the latter four were companies which have been bailed out by their governments and got
partly nationalized. Our analysis indicates that these governmental capital injections were
indeed justifiable as these companies have been (and still are) in the core of the network
and therefore serve as distributors and multipliers of systemic risk. According to the
identified network connections, failure of one of these institutions would substantially
threaten the stability of the financial system.
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Systemic risk rankings
Table 2 reports systemic risk rankings for all quarters between the beginning of 2007 and
the end of 2010. They are based on realized systemic risk betas at the end of the respective
foregoing quarter, and therefore contain forecasts of relative systemic relevance. Prior to
the estimation, we conducted a test on joint significance of V aRi and V aRi ·Zi∗ with i =
1, ...20, for V aRs, using all five years of data. Apart from two exceptions, all individual
VaRs turn out to be statistically significant for the system’s VaR. The two exceptions
are, on the one hand, Banco Espirito Santo, which is the largest bank in Portugal, but
much less internationally active than the other banks in our sample. On the other hand,
Société Generale is found to be insignificant. We attribute this finding to the fact that in
2008, the bank was affected by large losses induced by the unauthorized propriety trading
of one of its employees. This was a materialization of (idiosyncratic) operational risk,
and may have distorted the test results concerning systemic relevance. We expect that
on a longer horizon, Société Generale’ systemic risk beta would be significant. In the
following, however, we exclude it from the systemic risk rankings, together with Banco
Espirito Santo.
It should be noted, that often differences in beta estimates between direct neighboring
firms in the obtained rankings are small and thus not statistically significant. Hence order-
ings in Table 2 should rather be seen as an indication for a company’s relative systemic
importance characterizing groups of similar relative systemic impact.3 Figure 5 illustrates
the time-varying cross-sectional distribution of the estimated betas. We observe the over-
all highest systemic risk betas during the height of the financial crisis. Furthermore, rep-
resentatively for other firms, we depict the estimated systemic impacts of Barclays, Crédit
Agricole, Santander and UBS. It turns out that the respective systemic risk betas move in
locksteps before mid 2008, but strongly diverge during the crisis. Similar relationships
are also shown for other companies and reflect distinct crisis-specific effects.
3At some time points, estimated systemic risk betas become negative. We interpret this finding as
negligible systemic impacts of the respective firm in the respective quarter and therefore omit it in the
ranking.
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These effects are supported by Table 2 revealing strong variations of the relative sys-
temic riskiness during the crisis. This is obviously induced by a severe instability of the
financial system during this period and is also confirmed by the high variability of network
connections as discussed above. Conversely, a higher stability of systemic risk patterns
over time is observed in the periods before and after the financial crisis (i.e., 2007 and
2010).
Overall, we identify BNP Paribas, HSBC and Santander as being most risky with the
highest realized risk betas between 2007 and 2010. BNP Paribas was strongly affected by
the credit crunch and an evaporation of liquidity in the funding market in 2007/08 and was
bailed out by the French government end of October. Our findings reflect that after the
bailout, BNP’s systemic riskiness was still comparably high. According to the network
analysis above, this is obviously due its strong interconnectedness making BNP to one of
the major originators of tail risk spillovers in 2010. In contrast HSBC’s connectedness
is only moderate. However, its size and the identified tail risk connections to Barclays,
BNP and Santander make it systemically quite risky. These connections became obvi-
ously quite relevant due to HSBC’s heavy exposure to U.S. housing and credit markets.
Consequently, the bank’s distress induced by significant losses during the crisis have been
spread out in the system resulting in a particularly high systemic riskiness around begin-
ning of 2009. This is backed by the fact that HSBC had to cut a substantial amount of jobs
at beginning of 2009. Our results indicate that also in the aftermath of the crisis, HSBC
still remains systemically quite risky. In case of Santander, the relative systemic riskiness
(compared to other banks) even tends to increase after the financial crisis (particularly in
2010). This finding might already indicate funding problems in the Spanish banking mar-
ket becoming particularly evident in 2012. These results are in line with the findings of
the network analysis above identifying Santander as a deeply interconnected bank being
linked to several insurance companies and (particularly during the crisis) to other major
players like Barclays and HSBC.
14
Monitoring systemic risk rankings over the course of the financial crisis provides inter-
esting insights into the systemic importance of individual firms under extreme conditions
of market distress. Four prominent examples are RBS, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and
HBSC. According to the estimated systemic risk betas, we classify RBS as belonging
to the most systemically risky companies in 2008. Also Barclays is identified as being
systemically very relevant in several (though not all) periods in 2008/09. The identified
network connections revealed that the strong connection between Barclays and RBS was
obviously one driving force of the systemic relevance of both. This is also confirmed by
the fact that the systemic relevance of both (as indicated by the realized betas) declined as
the tail risk connection between both vanishes in 2009. Likewise, Deutsche Bank faces a
steady increase of its systemic relevance in 2007 and belongs to the group of systemically
most risky companies in 2008. This is confirmed by the network analysis above showing
that particularly during 2008, Deutsche Bank was deeply interconnected with risk chan-
nels to various major insurance companies. Consequently, a default of Deutsche Bank
would have had dramatic consequences for the insurance industry and thus the stability of
the entire system. Although Deutsche Bank was not subject to any government bailouts
it went through a process of substantial internal restructuring. This is confirmed by our
estimates showing a decline of Deutsche Bank’s systemic importance during 2009 and
2010.
Finally, for the post-crisis period, we observe a tendency for the insurance companies
becoming relatively more risky. Particularly in 2010, Allianz, Aviva, Axa, Generali and
Münchener Rück reveal relatively high (though not always significant) systemic risk be-
tas. Likewise, also Société Générale and Credit Suisse are identified as systemically risky
in 2010. These findings are confirmed by the network analysis showing a comparably
high connectedness of Société Générale, Axa and Generali.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a framework for forecasting financial institutions’ marginal con-
tribution to systemic risk based on their interconnectedness in terms of extreme downside
risks. There are four major challenges in this context: Firms’ (conditional) tail risks
are unobserved and must be estimated from data. Determining such individual risk lev-
els appropriately results in high-dimensional models due to the large number of poten-
tial network connections. These network dependencies, however, are inherently instable
over time. Therefore forecasting stability and responsiveness require careful balancing.
To tackle these issues, we adapt the two-stage quantile regression approach by Hautsch,
Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012) to a rolling window out-of-sample prediction setting
based on time-varying networks.
In a sample of large European banks covering the period 2007 to 2010, the adapted pro-
cedure reveals the dynamic nature of interconnectedness and corresponding risk channels
in the European financial system around and during the financial crisis. The time evolu-
tion of network dependencies provides valuable insights into a bank’s role in the system
identifying originators and transmitters of tail risk over time. Determined relevant tail risk
connections and systemic risk rankings both provide valuable input for regulation. Given
the need for better and more timely market surveillance, our approach can thus serve as a




Table 1: List of included financial institutions. As most of them provide a
broad range of services, we differentiate between banks and insurance com-
panies, according to their main field of business activities. Furthermore, we
state the country their headquarters are located in.
Aegon (Insurance, NL) Deutsche Bank (Bank, DE)
Allianz (Insurance, DE) Generali (Insurance, IT)
Aviva (Insurance, UK) HSBC (Bank, UK)
AXA (Insurance, FR) ING Groep (Bank, NL)
Banco Espirito Santo (Bank, PT) Lloyds Banking Group (UK)
Barclays (Bank, UK) Muenchener Rueck (Insurance, DE)
BNP Paribas (Bank, FR) Royal Bank of Scotland (Bank, UK)
Commerzbank (Insurance, DE) Santander (Bank, ES)
Crédit Agricole (Bank, FR) Société Générale (Bank, FR)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Systemic risk rankings for 2007 - 2010, based on quarterly re-
alized beta forecasts β̃s|i · 100, see equation 4.5
rank name forecast rank name forecast
Q1.2007 Q2.2007
1 Aegon 0.7667 1 BNP Paribas 1.0964
2 Commerzbank 0.6495 2 UBS 0.434
3 Generali 0.5392 3 Aviva 0.3012
4 Credit Agricole 0.5077 4 Commerzbank 0.276
5 Barclays 0.3703 5 Deutsche Bank 0.2436
6 HSBC 0.3611 6 AXA 0.2324
7 Allianz 0.3492 7 Aegon 0.2095
8 BNP Paribas 0.3016 8 Muenchener Rueck 0.1625
9 Lloyds 0.2887 9 Allianz 0.1252
10 AXA 0.2453 10 ING 0.0914
11 Aviva 0.1888 11 Credit Suisse 0.0865
12 ING 0.163 12 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.051
13 Deutsche Bank 0.1379 13 Santander 0.0393
14 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0556 14 Barclays 0.0067
Q3.2007 Q4.2007
1 UBS 0.4234 1 Deutsche Bank 0.71
2 HSBC 0.3127 2 Aviva 0.5619
3 Deutsche Bank 0.3068 3 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.5504
4 Credit Suisse 0.2296 4 Credit Agricole 0.4205
5 Generali 0.2087 5 BNP Paribas 0.3934
6 Santander 0.1947 6 Credit Suisse 0.3529
7 Barclays 0.1663 7 AXA 0.3306
8 AXA 0.1425 8 HSBC 0.3203
9 ING 0.1203 9 ING 0.3126
10 Credit Agricole 0.1007 10 Aegon 0.3104
11 Commerzbank 0.0681 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.1954






1 BNP Paribas 0.5472 1 AXA 0.9152
2 Barclays 0.487 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.8259
3 Santander 0.4507 3 Muenchener Rueck 0.7661
4 Commerzbank 0.4375 4 Lloyds 0.5474
5 Deutsche Bank 0.3819 5 Generali 0.543
6 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.3783 6 Credit Agricole 0.5294
7 Credit Suisse 0.3508 7 BNP Paribas 0.5003
8 AXA 0.2114 8 Deutsche Bank 0.4948
9 Credit Agricole 0.1429 9 HSBC 0.4339
10 Muenchener Rueck 0.1351 10 Commerzbank 0.35
11 Allianz 0.1281 11 Aegon 0.2153
12 Lloyds 0.1148 12 Aviva 0.201
13 Aviva 0.071 13 Barclays 0.1925
14 Aegon 0.0255 14 Santander 0.1582




1 Santander 1.07 1 HSBC 1.4631
2 Barclays 0.7768 2 Deutsche Bank 0.6341
3 Aviva 0.4461 3 Santander 0.5148
4 Credit Suisse 0.4029 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.4998
5 Generali 0.349 5 BNP Paribas 0.3873
6 Muenchener Rueck 0.2384 6 UBS 0.346
7 Deutsche Bank 0.2113 7 Generali 0.3118
8 HSBC 0.1727 8 Muenchener Rueck 0.2926
9 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.167 9 Lloyds 0.0985
10 ING 0.1566
11 BNP Paribas 0.0598
Continued on next page
5Avoiding multicollinearity, we include in Zi∗ only the one component of Zi which exhibits the lowest
correlation with V aRi in the respective interaction term in (3).
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
rank name forecast rank name forecast
Q1.2009 Q2.2009
1 Aegon 2.1546 1 Aegon 2.0523
2 Barclays 1.7557 2 ING 1.4088
3 AXA 1.5601 3 Lloyds 1.3672
4 Aviva 1.5562 4 BNP Paribas 1.3462
5 Allianz 1.3241 5 Santander 1.3259
6 BNP Paribas 0.8262 6 Barclays 1.031
7 Credit Agricole 0.7485 7 Aviva 0.9001
8 HSBC 0.6697 8 HSBC 0.732
9 Santander 0.5945 9 Credit Agricole 0.7251
10 UBS 0.5514 10 Credit Suisse 0.4722
11 Commerzbank 0.2947 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.4417
12 Generali 0.2347 12 Allianz 0.4111
13 Credit Suisse 0.1561 13 AXA 0.2842
14 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.068 14 UBS 0.1028
15 ING 0.0455 15 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0619
Q3.2009 Q4.2009
1 Commerzbank 1.1065 1 Santander 1.0097
2 Aviva 1.0086 2 Credit Agricole 0.9243
3 ING 0.8852 3 HSBC 0.8437
4 AXA 0.8303 4 BNP Paribas 0.6894
5 Lloyds 0.7041 5 Allianz 0.6225
6 BNP Paribas 0.6744 6 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.6093
7 Santander 0.6615 7 Barclays 0.5571
8 Credit Suisse 0.568 8 Lloyds 0.4588
9 Aegon 0.3393 9 ING 0.3702
10 HSBC 0.284 10 Deutsche Bank 0.3661
11 Credit Agricole 0.1044 11 AXA 0.1541
12 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0325 12 Generali 0.0858
13 UBS 0.0276 13 Aviva 0.0699
14 Muenchener Rueck 0.0471
Q1.2010 Q2.2010
1 Credit Suisse 1.058 1 Credit Suisse 0.8629
2 Lloyds 1.0418 2 UBS 0.7561
3 Generali 1.0407 3 ING 0.5004
4 UBS 1.0388 4 Aviva 0.4999
5 Aegon 0.9752 5 Generali 0.4217
6 Allianz 0.7554 6 Santander 0.4
7 AXA 0.7471 7 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.3386
8 BNP Paribas 0.6706 8 Aegon 0.2928
9 Santander 0.5692 9 Deutsche Bank 0.2234
10 Commerzbank 0.5583 10 Allianz 0.2227
11 Aviva 0.5208 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.1033
12 HSBC 0.4992 12 Credit Agricole 0.0703
13 ING 0.4722 13 AXA 0.0384
14 Deutsche Bank 0.4712 14 BNP Paribas 0.016
15 Credit Agricole 0.4019
16 Barclays 0.2284
17 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.1944
Q3.2010 Q4.2010
1 Aviva 0.6092 1 BNP Paribas 1.4491
2 Generali 0.6008 2 Generali 0.503
3 HSBC 0.4951 3 Muenchener Rueck 0.4914
4 Santander 0.4588 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.4371
5 Credit Suisse 0.4493 5 Santander 0.3784
6 Muenchener Rueck 0.261 6 Aviva 0.3737
7 Aegon 0.2226 7 Allianz 0.3589
8 UBS 0.151 8 ING 0.3017
9 Credit Agricole 0.1475 9 AXA 0.2553
10 ING 0.1452 10 UBS 0.1886
11 AXA 0.1233 11 Commerzbank 0.1858
12 Allianz 0.1148 12 Aegon 0.1367
13 Commerzbank 0.0935 13 Credit Agricole 0.0334
14 BNP Paribas 0.0554
15 Lloyds 0.0426
16 Barclays 0.0345
17 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0222
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